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EDITORIAL COMMENT

the discussion and settlement of the problems relating to conventional tariffs,
extraterritorial rights and foreign settlements in China, "is whether China
now has a stable government capable of carrying out these treaty obligations." The nine-Power identic note of September 4th also admonished
China of "the necessity of giving concrete evidence of its ability and willingness to enforce respect for the safety of foreign lives and property and to
suppress disorders and anti-foreign agitations" as a condition for the carrying on of negotiations in regard to the desires which the Chinese Government
has presented for the consideration of the treaty Powers.
GEORGE

A. FINCH.

THE RUSSIAN REINSURANCE COMPANY CASE

In comments upon the later recognition cases, published in a recent issue
of this Journal,' the present writer suggested that as an aid in determining
the effect which courts may properly attribute to the acts, ordinances, or
laws of an unrecognized de facto government, the formula that all matters of
recognition are for the political departments to decide is of little use. Attention was directed especially to two recent opinions of the New York
Court of Appeals2 in which the formula's insufficiency had been indicated
in language at once significant and illuminating. It was hopefully remarked
that the realistic attitude revealed in these opinions would in all probability
find expression sooner or later in a decision of sufficient importance to make
a leading case. The comments containing the remark were hardly through
the press before the anticipated decision had been rendered. The case
was decided April 7, 1925, and is reported as Russian Reinsurance Company
v. Stoddard and Bankers Trust Company. 3
The facts in the Russian Reinsurance Company case were without precedent. The Reinsurance Company had been incorporated in Russia in 1899
under a special statute constituting its charter and by-laws. In 1906 it
had obtained permission to do business in New York, depositing securities
and funds of the company for the protection of local policyholders and
creditors as required by New York law. In 1917 the revolutionary Soviet
Government was established in Russia and seven of the eight persons constituting the company's board of directors were driven into exile. In 1918
Soviet decrees nationalized the company, confiscated its property, and
apparently terminated its corporate existence. 4 Nevertheless, the exiled
directors held meetings in Paris and continued to direct the company's
1 "Recent Recognition Cases," this JoiuwqA, Vol. 19, p. 263 (April, 1925).
2Sokoloff V. National City Bank, (1924) 239 N. Y. 158; Fred S. James & Co. v. Second

Russian Insurance Co. (1925) 239 N. Y. 248.
' (1925) 240 N. Y. 149; 147 N. E. 703.
4In recent English cases it was argued before the House of Lords that Soviet nationalization decrees had terminated the corporate existence of Russian banks, but the House of

Lords was not satisfied that the Soviet decrees were intended to have this effect. Russian
Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Comptoir d'Escompte de Mulhouse, [1925] A. C. 112;
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business outside Russia. In 1923, after the company's last reinsurance
contract in the United States had expired, these directors proceeded to
liquidate. They instituted the present suit in the company's name against
the defendant Trust Company, with whom the Reinsurance Company's
securities and funds had been deposited, joining the State Superintendent
of Insurance as a party defendant, to compel the return of as much of the
securities and funds as were no longer required to satisfy outstanding obligations. The Trust Company claimed no interest in the securities and funds
except as trustee or depositary, but set up as a defence the Soviet nationalization decrees and contended that either the plaintiff corporation was no
longer in existence, or was without capacity to sue, or was not represented
by the persons claiming to be directors, and that the New York courts should
not take jurisdiction because they could not give a judgment which would
be binding upon other parties not before the court and who might thereafter
establish valid claims.
The decision was for the plaintiff company in the lower court on the
ground that the case justified no exception to the general rule that acts or
decrees of an unrecognized government are to be regarded as nullities.6
The Soviet Government remaining unrecognized by the United States, it
was thought that in courts of the United States at least the existence and
standing of the Russian company-must remain unaffected by the Soviet
decrees. The New York Court of Appeals repudiated this reasoning and
reversed the decision. It was held, Crane, J., dissenting, that the court's
inability by its judgment to protect the defendant Trust Company against
a second recovery upon the same cause of action required the dismissal of
the suit. Considerations of policy founded upon justice and common sense
were invoked to justify the court in taking cognizance of conditions existing
in Russia, although those conditions had been largely created by a government from which recognition had been withheld.
The Court of Appeals assumed that in the absence of recognition no
court in the United States could regard decrees of the Soviet authorities
as the lawful decrees of a recognized government would be regarded. It
was pointed out, however, that the decrees of such a de facto authority may
affect the rights, obligations, or capacities of a corporate plaintiff in ways
which courts in the United States cannot justly ignore. While the Soviet
decrees in the instant case could not be treated as having lawfully terminated
the Reinsurance Company's corporate existence, it was nevertheless the
fact that they had prevented the company from doing business in Russia,
had taken the company's property in Russia and nationalized its business,
Banque Internationale de Commerce de Petrograd v. Goukassow, [1925] A. C. 150. More
recently a similar view has been taken by the German Court of Appeal (Kammergericht) of
Berlin. Juristische Wocheschrift, June 1, 1925. Professor Dr. Leo Zaitzeff of the University of Berlin kindly called the author's attention to the German case.
6(1925) 207 N. Y. Supp. 574.
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and had driven the company out, if it is possible to drive a corporation from
its domicile without destroying it, from the country in which it was originally created. Since March, 1917, there had been no directors' meetings in
Russia, as the charter provided, no elections or reflections of directors,
and no meetings of shareholders although the charter invested shareholders"
meetings with important powers. The seven exiled directors in Paris had
assumed sole management without direction or supervision. And the
government chiefly responsible for this situation was not only de facto in
Russia, but had been recognized by many if not most of the other countries
of Europe. Even in France, where the exiled directors had been meeting,
the Soviet Government had obtained belated recognition. In such circumstances, strict adherence to an inadequate premise would have accomplished no other purpose than to exalt conceptions above common sense and
inappropriate juridical logic above the requirements of justice.
Delivering the opinion of the Court of Appeals, Judge Lehman said:
The situation is, not only without precedent, but anomalous. In
its domicile the corporation cannot function; the government of the
place where its directors sit has recognized as sovereign the government
of the country of the corporate domicile which has issued a decree
which either terminates the existence of the corporation, or at least
has terminated the right of directors or shareholders to act for the
corporation. Though we might say that for us such a decree is not the
law even of the country which the Soviet government rules, yet it is
enforced as the law in that country, and is recognized as the law of that
country by other great nations. The right of the directors to represent
the corporation, even the existence of that corporation, must be determined in accordance with the law of Russia. For us the law of Russia,
in its strict sense, may still be the law as it existed when the Czar ruled;
for other nations the law of Russia is the law sanctioned by the Soviet
Republic. Our view of what is the law of Russia rests upon a juridical
conception not always in consonance with fact; in other nations recognition has brought juridical conceptions and facts into harmony. Do
these juridical conceptions require us to hold that the law of Russia
has remained unchanged since December, 1917, that the Soviet Republic does not exist and, therefore, cannot act, that the plaintiff corporation still lives and is domiciled in Russia and is under the management
of its former directors, though we know that its property in Russia has
been sequestrated, its directors driven into exile, its business monopolized by an agency which enforces its decrees as if it were a government
and is recognized as a government by most of the countries of Europe?
Shall we recognize the right of the corporate directors to revoke the
deed of trust and to receive property deposited thereunder, though
their authority is no longer recognized in the country of the corporate
domicile, or in the country where the directors reside; though they
might probably urge the nonexistence of the corporation as a defense
to any action brought by policyholders, creditors or stockholders in
any forum which gives effect to the decree of nationalization made by
the Soviet Republic; and the corporation will be immune from suit
here after it withdraws from this jurisdiction? If the logical application
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of juridical conceptions leads to this result, then we should consider its
practical consequences to determine whether we have not been carried
beyond the "self-imposed limits of common sense and fairness." 6
The Court of Appeals concluded that it should refuse to take jurisdiction
because of the injustice which might be done the Trust Company by an
adverse judgment. Disregarding the possibility that the Soviet Government might be recognized eventually by the United States and after recognition present a claim to these securities and funds, and disregarding also
the possibility that the corporation itself might repudiate the authority
of the directors and seek to recover the funds, there still remained the
substantial possibility of a second recovery against the defendant Trust
Company in the courts of some foreign country where the Soviet Government had been recognized. While the courts of other countries would
ordinarily respect the decisions of American courts, it could not be safely
assumed that they would respect decisions "based upon somewhat doubtful
inferences drawn from disputed facts and resting on a premise of who is the
lawful sovereign of Russia which other jurisdictions are by their own public
policy compelled to deny." 7
In a notable passage, which may well come to be regarded as a classical
statement of the relation between the political and the judicial function in
matters of recognition, Judge Lehman said:
The fall of one governmental establishment and the substitution of
another governmental establishment which actually governs, which
is able to enforce its claims by military force and is obeyed by the
people over whom it rules, must profoundly affect all the acts and
duties, all the relations of those who live within the territory over
which the new establishment exercises rule. Its rule may be without
lawful foundation; but, lawful or unlawful, its existence is a fact, and
that fact cannot be destroyed by juridical concepts. The State Department determines whether it will recognize its existence as lawful,
and, until the State Department has recognized the new establishment,
the court may not pass upon its legitimacy or ascribe to its decrees all
the effect which inheres in the laws or orders of a sovereign. The
State Department determines only that question. It cannot determine
how far the private rights and obligations of individuals are affected
by acts of a body not sovereign, or with which our government will
have no dealings. That question does not concern our foreign relations.
It is not a political question, but a judicial question. The courts in
considering that question assume as a premise that until recognition
these acts are not in full sense law. Their conclusion must depend,
upon whether these have nevertheless had such an actual effect that
they may not be disregarded. In such case we deal with result rather
than cause. We do not pass upon what such an unrecognized governmental authority may do, or upon the right or wrong of what it has
done; we consider the effect upon others of that which has "been done,
primarily from the point of view of fact rather than of theory.8
EDwIN D. DiCoiNsoN.
8 147 N. B. 703, 706.

't 147 N. E. 703, 708.

&147 N. E. 703, 705.

